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1. Introduction
On June 19, 2006, after being investigated for fourteen hours by the National 
Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), Suwarna 
Abdul Fatah, governor of East Kalimantan, was formally arrested on suspicion of 
corruption in an oil-palm plantation project. He was accused of issuing a permit for the 
opening up of around one-million hectares of the province's forest to oil-palm 
plantation development without proper legal process. It turned out that the Surya 
Dumai Group, which had obtained the permit, cleared the land for timber but did not 
open the plantation. Instead, it smuggled the trees to Tawau, the south westernmost 
town in Sabah, Malaysia.2 The company's president, Martias, was also arrested, on
1 I would like to thank Professor Takashi Shiraishi, Professor Patricio Abinales, and Associate Professor 
Caroline Hau for their helpful reviews and comments. I am also grateful to those who helped me during 
my stay in Central and East Kalimantan, although I cannot mention their names for obvious reasons. 
Initial research was carried out in East and Central Kalimantan under a doctoral fellowship from Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), during 2003-06. The essay was written under a postdoctoral 
fellowship from JSPS.
2 Riky Ferdianto, "Gubernur Kalimantan Timur Ditahan," Tempo Interaktif, June 19, 2006. Tutut Herlina,
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August 3, 2006. Nine months after his arrest, Suwarna was sentenced to seven years in 
prison on March 2, 2007, while Martias was jailed for eighteen months as an 
accomplice. The prosecutor estimated the state lost over 346.8 billion rupiah (roughly 
US$38 million) from the fictitious plantation project and timber smuggling.3
Like its easterly neighbor, the province of Central Kalimantan was devastated by 
large-scale illegal logging, particularly in Tanjung Puting National Park, located in the 
southwestern part of the province. The Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops 
estimated the value of the timber stolen from the national park annually to be around 
70 billion rupiah (roughly US$8 million).4 Domestic and international environment 
groups accused a company owned by Abdul Rasyid, a local timber businessman, of 
being responsible for the illegal logging. While the central government eventually did 
initiate nationwide anti-illegal logging operations in 2001, adding Central Kalimantan 
in 2003, Abdul Rasyid and his "friends" in government were never prosecuted.5
How do we account for the very different fates of these powerful local actors? I 
would suggest that these differing outcomes—jail time for Suwarna and Martias, no 
prosecution of Abdul Rasyid and his political associates—were not caused by the 
ability or inability of state agencies to crack down on illegal logging. Rather the causes 
of these end results can be traced back to the kinds of local political contests these elites 
were involved in, as well as the nature of national-local relationships that either 
persisted or developed in the post-Suharto era.
Under Suharto, regional governments were strictly limited in their power and 
access to and use of revenue sources. The central government appointed local 
government heads (governors, mayors, and district heads) and reinforced this control 
of appointments with a substantial bureaucracy, as well as control of regional and 
subregional military commands that reported directly to Jakarta. Local assemblies 
were rendered powerless by the majority seats held by the government party, Golkar, 
backed by appointed members from the military and police. The two opposition 
parties—the secular Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI) 
and the Islamic United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 
PPP)—were allowed to participate in parliamentary elections, but only under the 
strictest of terms imposed by the government.
Democratization produced a number of new political parties, brought about freer 
and even fairer elections, and reduced considerably the military's political role. 
Administrative decentralization was also implemented, transferring much of the
"Digelandang" KPK ke Rutan, Suwarna Ajukan Penangguhan," Sinar Harapan, June 20, 2006. Arif A. 
Kuswardono and Riky Ferdianto, "Akhirnya Suwarna Pasrah," Tempo 18,35, June 26-July 2, 2006, 
http:/ / www.tempointeractive.com/hg/mbmtempo/arsip/2006/0 6 /26/HK/mbm.20060626. hkl.id.html 
(accessed April 14, 2008).
3 Kartika Candra, "Suwarna A.F Dituntut 7 Tahun," Tempointeraktif, March 2, 2007. Cheta Nilawaty and 
Sukma Loppies, "KPK Sita Aset Bos Surya Dumai Group," Tempointeraktif, February 29, 2008.
4 Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Telapak Indonesia, Ulegal Logging in Tanjung Puting 
National Park: An Update on the Pinal Cur Report (London, Washington, DC, and Bogor: EIA and Telapak 
Indonesia, 2000), p. 19.
5 In fact, one of Rasyid's family members (perhaps his nephew), Rahmat Nasution, who works for his 
company, was arrested on suspicion of timber smuggling by the navy, and the case was later delegated to 
the national police. However, the case essentially dissolved after it was handed over to the local court.
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central government's authority to the regional governments. The latter—down to the 
district level—could now enact new local taxes and regulations, and their heads were 
now elected, rather than appointed. These shifts created tremendous economic and 
political opportunities for local elites, but also made contests for local power, especially 
during elections, fierce and intense.
These changes have been the subject of a host of studies focusing on post-Suharto 
Indonesian politics. Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, for example, note how the 
reorganizing of power from the national to the regional levels created "oligarchies" 
centered on alliances with politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspeople—all of whom 
were nurtured under the Suharto regime.6 Hadiz argues that, at the local level,
... the newly salient political actors have tended to be small and medium-level 
entrepreneurs who are at least partly dependent on state projects and contracts; 
professional politicians with links to the old New Order parties; or activists 
who have latched onto organizations ... from which the New Order regularly 
recruited new apparatchiks and fixers."7
In some provinces like North Sumatra, these local actors collaborated with figures or 
groups in control of various apparatuses of violence to buy votes, intimidate voters, 
and attack supporters of the rival candidates during elections for local government 
head.8 These observations were confirmed by John Sidel, who described the rise of 
local businessmen and "local mafia"9 as political powerbrokers who provide money 
and issue threats of violence during the elections.10
Other studies take a much closer look at the local actors themselves. Some 
complement or deepen the arguments of Robison, Hadiz, and Sidel by examining the 
origins of these business groups and criminal alliances in particular regions.11 Others
6 Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics o f Oligarchy in an Age o f  
Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 245—47.
7 Vedi R. Hadiz, "Power and Politics in North Sumatra: The Uncompleted Reformasi," in Local Power and 
Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation, ed. Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 125.
8 Ibid., pp. 125-27.
9 John Sidel uses the term "local mafias" to refer to Indonesian "criminals" who emerged in the 1980s 
from among retired lower- and middle-ranking military officers serving in the regions. After retiring, 
these officers became real-estate speculators, fixers, commission agents, local monopolists, and racketeers, 
assisted by local alliances, including marriage connections, business partnerships with local elites, and 
their links to their own former subordinates within the active military, who were able to help them 
manipulate personnel appointments and hirings. In Sidel's discussion, the term "local mafias" also 
includes gangsters (preman) belonging to the para-statal youth groups such as Pemuda Pancasila. Such 
groups controlled various criminal rackets and provided muscle for strike-breaking, repression of 
opposition protest, and illicit election-related services in the late Suharto years. See John T. Sidel, "Bossism 
and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia: Toward an Alternative Framework for the 
Study of'Local Strongmen/" in Politicising Democracy: The New Local Politics o f Democratization, ed. John 
Harris et al. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 62-63.
10 Ibid., pp. 66-69.
11 See Abdul Hamid, "Jawara dan Penguasaan Politik Lokal di Banten"; Untung Widyanto, "Jagoan 
Betawi dari Cakung"; Abdul Rozali, "Sosial Origin dan Politik Kuasa Blater di Madura"; and I Ngurah 
Suryawan, "Bisnis Kekerasaan Jagoan Berkeris: Catalan Awal Aksi Pecalang dan Kelompok Milisi di 
Bali," all in Kelompok Kekerasan dan Bos Lokal di Era Reformasi, ed. Masaaki Okamoto and Abdul Rozaki 
(Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2006), pp. 21-44, 45-66, 67-89, 91-114.
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use the notion of "a shadow state"12 to describe how these local businessmen and 
leaders of gangsters use state agencies like the local bureaucracy, the military, and the 
police at the regional levels to gain or protect their economic interests, including those 
in the informal sector.13 Still, others imply that the emergence of influential business 
and criminal networks was never a uniform process, but consisted of different patterns 
and features depending on the region. For example, in South Sulawesi and West 
Sumba, local aristocracies survived the profound changes at the national level and 
maintained their position as local Golkar leaders or took the lead in forming new 
parties. They consolidated their positions in political contests by invoking their 
nobility, availing of existing religious or school networks and/or marriage alliance 
networks, and by using their financial resources.14
Other scholars explore how, in many regions, local elites have been using ethnic, 
religious, and/or regional identity as ideological justification in their struggle to 
pursue political and economic interests. They have cited prominent examples of this 
phenomenon, such as the vigorous campaigns for putra daerah15 that strengthened local 
political positions vis-a-vis the allocation of economic resources and government 
positions.16 The movements to establish new provinces and districts have also been 
guided or inspired by invocations of cultural identity. Many studies on the new 
province and district formations recognize that these religious or ethnic movements 
were driven by local sentiments, such as the feelings among ethnic and/or religious 
minorities that they had been politically and economically marginalized, the 
aspirations of certain groups for control of political and economic interests, and 
contests among neighboring districts or between province and district over the access 
to economic resources.17 There is also another pattern of regional identity politics
12 The notion of the "shadow state" was originally used in African and Indian studies. The key idea is that 
"political authority can be drawn, not from the possession of undisputed force, but from the ability to 
control markets and material rewards, or in other words, from hegemony in the 'black economy.'" See 
Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken, eds., Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), p. 24.
13 Erwiza Erman, "Deregulation of the Tin Trade and Creation of a Local Shadow State: A Bangka Case 
Study"; and Syarif Hidayat, "'Shadow State'? Business and Politics in the Province of Banten," both in 
Renegotiating Boundaries, ed. Nordholt and Klinken, pp. 177-201; 202-24.
14 Masaaki Okamoto, "5 nen okure no 'Kaikaku': 2004 nen Indonesia Minami Sulawesi shu ni okeru 
Gorkar to no Choraku [Belated Reformasi in South Sulawesi, Indonesia: The Declining Political Power of 
the Golkar Party in 2004]" Ajia Kenyu 51,2 (2005): 63-83. Jacqueline Vel, "Campaigning for a New District 
in West Sumba," in Renegotiating Boundaries, ed. Nordholt and Klinken, pp. 91-119.
15 The term putra daerah (literally, "sons of the soil") has been interpreted in a different way in each region. 
In some cases, it refers to indigenous ethnic groups, whereas elsewhere it refers to all residents of the 
region, including those who were not born in the place.
16 Local Power and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Aspinall and Fealy, p. 6. For example, Kumpiady Widen 
describes the strong local Dayak demands that the positions of governor, vice-governor, and all district 
and subdistrict heads be held in Central Kalimantan by native sons. See Kumpiady Widen, "The 
Resurgence of Dayak Identities: The Symbols of their Struggle for Regional Autonomy are Self-Evident," 
in Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local Society in Indonesia, ed. Sakai Minako (Adelaide: Crawford 
House Publishing, 2002), pp. 116-17.
17 George Quinn, "Coming Apart and Staying Together at the Centre: Debates over Provincial Status in 
Java and Madura," in Local Power and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Aspinall and Fealy, pp. 164—78. Yasuo Hukao, 
"Post-Soeharto Jidai Chiho Seiji no Kozu: Riau Gunto Shu Bunristu Undo no Jirei Kara [Features of 
Regional Politics after the Suharto Regime: The Formation Process of Riau Archipelago Province]," in 
Indonesia no Chiho Bunkenka: Bunkenka wo Meguru Chuo-Chiho no Dinamikuu to Riariti [Decentralization in 
Indonesia: Central-Local Dynamics and the Realities], ed. Matsui Kazuhisa (Chiba: Institute of Developing 
Economies, 2003), pp. 77-157. Lorraine V. Aragon, "Elite Competition in Central Sulawesi"; Myrna
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marked by toleration of heterogeneous interest groups and actors. In regions like West 
and Central Kalimantan, different provincial ethnic and/or religious groups share 
power at the provincial and district levels in a way that moderates the aspirations of 
each party and tempers the tensions between them. Political accommodation of this 
sort became more widespread after Kalimantan's elites learned the hard lessons taught 
by outbursts of communal violence between local Dayaks and Madurese immigrants in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.18
Finally, a group of studies, many of them written by Japanese scholars, has 
reexamined the nature of local political initiatives from a perspective that focuses on 
national-local relationships; in this way, these analyses seek to correct the imbalance 
arising from the tendency of many studies to grant post-Suharto national state actors 
very little role in defining the institutional rules of the game at the regional level. Their 
works suggest that the end of the authoritarian period witnessed the emergence of new 
multidirectional national-local ties, where local elites were now able to negotiate 
and/or fight with their national colleagues for the achievement of regional objectives 
and ambitions.19 These scholars argue that the importance of continued links with 
Jakarta becomes very evident if examined, particularly in the process of new-province 
formation, 20 and in disputes between the central government and regional 
governments over control of natural and mineral resources.21
Eindhoven, "New Colonizers? Identity, Representation, and Government in the Post-New Order 
Mentawai Archipelago"; Jacqueline Vel, "Campaigning for a New District in West Sumba"; and Dik Roth, 
"Many Governors, No Province: The Struggle for a Province in the Luwu-Tana Toraja Area in South 
Sulawesi," all in Renegotiating Boundaries, ed. Nordholt and Klinken, pp. 40-66, 67-89, 91-119,121^17. 
Ehito Kimura, "Marginality and Opportunity in the Periphery: The Emergence of Gorontalo Province in 
North Sulawesi," Indonesia 84 (October 2007): 71-95. Wahyu Prasetyawan, "Post-Soeharto Ki ni okeru Seiji 
Keizai: Riau Shu ni okeru Seihukan Tairitsu, 1998-2004 nen, [The Political Economy of Post Suharto 
Indonesia: Intergovernmental Conflict in Riau, 1998-2004]," Southeast Asian Studies 45,1 (2007): 120-36. 
Masaaki Okamoto, "Jichitai Shinsetsu Undo to Seinen no Politics: Gorontalo Sinshu Setsuritsu Undo (1998 
nen-2000 nen) ni Shoten wo Atete [The Politics of Youth and Autonomy: The Case of Gorontalo Province 
(1998-2000)]," Tonanajia Kenkyu 45,1 (2007): 137-58.
18 Akiko Morishita, "Berebut Kuasa di Kalimantan: Pergulatan Ekonomi Politik Bos Lokal di Era 
Desentralisasi (1998-2004)," in Kelompok Kekerasan dan Bos Lokal di Era Reformasi, ed. Okamoto and Rozaki, 
pp. 127-49. Taufiq Tanasaldy, "Ethnic Identity Politics in West Kalimantan," in Renegotiating Boundaries, 
ed. Nordholt and Klinken, pp. 349-71. "Dayak" is a generic and loose term for indigenous peoples living 
principally in the interior of Borneo.
19 Kimura, "Marginality and Opportunity in the Periphery," p. 95.
20 For a discussion of the important role of national politicians in the process of new province formation, 
see Kimura, "Marginality and Opportunity in the Periphery," pp. 92-94; Okamoto, "jichitai Shinsetsu 
Undo to Seinen no Politics," pp. 152-56; Hukao, "Post-Soeharto Jidai Chiho Seiji no Kozu," pp. 106-36; 
and Prasetyawan, "Post Suharto Ki ni okeru Seiji Keizai," pp. 130-32.
21 There have been three main disputes between the central government and regional governments over 
control of business interests in the mining sector since the fall of Suharto. They concern conflicts over 
privatization of a state-owned cement company in West Sumatra; divestment of a multinational 
coal-mining company in East Kalimantan; and control of an oil block in Riau. See Minako Sakai, "The 
Privatization of Padan Cement: Regional Identity and Economic Hegemony in the New Era of 
Decentralization," in Local Power and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Aspinall and Fealy, pp. 148-63. Wahyu 
Prasetyawan, "The Unfinished Privatization of Semen Padang: The Structure of the Political Economy in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia," Indonesia 81 (April 2006): 51-70. Wahyu Prasetyawan, "Government and 
Multinationals: Conflict over Economic Resources in East Kalimantan, 1998-2003," Southeast Asian Studies 
43,2 (2005): 161-90. Prasetyawan, "Post Suharto Ki ni okeru Seiji Keizai," pp. 120-36.
86 Akiko Morishita
While mindful of the insights provided by these many studies, in this essay I wish 
to add to these diverse approaches by looking at local politics in post-Suharto 
Indonesia through a comparative study of provinces, in this case, East Kalimantan and 
Central Kalimantan. I hope to demonstrate how realignments in national politics are 
linked to the reorganization of power at the regional levels and how these affect 
local-national relations. This is an area that has not been examined in great detail by 
the scholars cited above. East Kalimantan exemplifies this closely linked national-local 
relationship, for in this region former provincial political elites won the posts of 
governor, mayor, and district head after the fall of Suharto thanks in large part to their 
continued powerful connections with national state leaders and business groups. It 
also means that these local leaders would become vulnerable once major realignments 
take place in national politics, particularly when their Jakarta patrons fall from power 
or become considerably weakened after a major political battle.
In Central Kalimantan, however, local political conditions tend to be neglected by 
national political leaders, and thus a few powerful local businessmen were able to gain 
control over local politics in the post-Suharto period owing to their immense financial 
clout, the ability to mobilize local thugs, and their tight collusion with local politicians 
and bureaucrats. One could explain this phenomenon through concepts like "local 
oligarchies" or "local mafias," but these are not helpful when examining regional cases 
comparatively, and especially when an adjoining region exhibits contrary 
characteristics. If all groups of local politicians are perceived as oligarchies or mafias, 
the temptation then is to conclude that the political situations in other regions of the 
country must be similar.
Few studies have provided us with a clear framework that would help determine 
the factors that have shaped the different contours of local politics in this region. Sidel 
implies that a particular type of power holder is likely to emerge in industrial cities 
and forested and mineral-rich localities in Indonesia. He cites the case of suburban 
industrial zones in the Philippines where "local bosses"22 served as "the handmaidens 
of economic growth, facilitating land conversion and labour repression and reaping 
huge profits as real-estate brokers and construction moguls."23 He suggests that such a 
local-boss type of power holder has likewise overseen industrial growth in cities and 
natural resource extraction in resource-rich regions in Indonesia. However, Sidel's 
argument does not account for the difference between East and Central Kalimantan 
because both provinces are primarily noted for their natural resources. Specifically, 
East Kalimantan has plenty of mineral resources such as oil, natural gas, and coal, 
along with forest resources, while Central Kalimantan is rich in forest resources.
I believe that natural resources are one of the keys to understanding different 
political features among regions, and that one should pay closer attention to the nature 
of these resources and seek to determine who has access to the resources and how. A 
comparison of mineral-rich East Kalimantan and forested Central Kalimantan will 
show how the difference between the resources of these two locales shapes the nature 
of access and the structures of related industries, which, in turn, lead to the contrasts in
22 The term "local bosses" is defined by Sidel as "local brokers who enjoy an enduring monopolistic 
position over coercive and economic resources within their respective bailiwicks" in the Philippines. See 
Sidel, "Bossism and Democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia," p. 56.
23 Ibid., p. 72.
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the patterns of national-local relationships and the forms of local contests. Natural 
resources have not been considered as an independent variable when analyzing 
Kalimantan politics comparatively; more often, scholars have attended to divisive 
ethnic politics, which are often said to have arisen only when the communal violence 
between Dayaks and Madurese broke out in the late 1990s and early 2000s.24 
Moreover, most studies on post-Suharto Kalimantan politics focus on the Dayak 
political aspirations for local government posts that had been "freed" from the shackles 
of the Suharto era.25 Ethnic composition is obviously an important aspect to consider, 
but what I want to do is enrich further our understanding of Kalimantan politics by 
factoring in the exploitation of natural resources as a key element that affects the
24 While the violent conflicts between the Dayaks and Madurese immigrants took place in West 
Kalimantan in 1996-97 and 1999-2000, the Dayak-Madura conflicts in Central Kalimantan occurred in 
2000-2001. It was estimated that a total of at least 1,200 people, the majority of whom were Madurese, 
were killed in these uprisings. Those who carried out the violence were most likely mobilized by local 
Dayak political leaders, who were largely Christians and feared political marginalization, since Muslims 
had recently expanded their political influence, as they had been favored as appointees to become local 
government heads under the Suharto regime. For this reason, the Dayak elite sought representation in 
government through violence, which became extensive and fierce after the fall of Suharto. The local Malay 
population also took part in attacking Madurese during the 1999-2000 violence in West Kalimantan, most 
likely because the Dayak resurgence made Malay political leaders fear that Dayaks would claim all crucial 
positions in government. The Malay elites thus needed to take measures to fortify Malay solidarity and 
their own political influence. For a discussion of the political resurgence of the Dayaks and the 1996-97 
and 1999-2000 conflicts in West Kalimantan, see Jamie Seth Davidson, "Violence and Politics in West 
Kalimantan, Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, University of Washington, 2002).
It has been said that, in Central Kalimantan, the violent killings of Madurese by the Dayaks were led by 
a local Dayak NGO group, the Central Kalimantan Dayak Community Consultative Institute (Lembaga 
Musyawarah Masyarakat Dayak dan Daerah Kalimantan Tengah, LMMDD-KT). The organization was 
established in 1994 by a local university professor, KMA Usop, who later ran as a candidate in and lost the 
2000 gubernatorial election. Some of the leading members of LMMDD-KT, who were mostly Christians, 
worked in government, and they were unsatisfied with the results of the post-Suharto local elections since 
Muslim candidates won the contests to become governor and all five district heads, as a result of which 
Muslim officers were often favored in the bureaucracy. After the conflicts, LMMDD-KT gained influence 
in local politics, putting forward its members as district heads in three new districts (Murung Raya, 
Katingan, and Lamandau) in 2003. Furthermore, a well-known Christian Dayak politician, Agustin Teras 
Narang (for his personal profile, see Footnote 94), defeated the incumbent Muslim governor in the 2005 
election. According to some sources, it was actually Narang and his family who were the masterminds 
behind the 2000-2001 massacre of the Madurese, although there is no firm evidence to prove this. For a 
discussion of the role of LMMDD-KT in the 2000-2001 violence in Central Kalimantan, see Gerry van 
Klinken, "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elites," in Indonesia in Search o f Transition, ed. H. S. Nordholt and Irwan 
Abdullah (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002), pp. 67-105. A chronicle and list of the causes of the conflict 
are also analyzed by International Crisis Group (ICG), "Communal Violence In Indonesia: Lessons From 
Kalimantan," ICG Asia Report 19 (Jakarta and Brussels: ICG, 2001).
Yet, LMMDD-KT is, in fact, a relatively minor actor in provincial politics, since it has had influence only 
in a few remote and economically worthless districts, while districts embracing major bases for the timber 
industries and large-scale plantations were generally controlled by powerful local businessmen, one of 
whom is Abdul Rasyid—the focus of this essay. Moreover, LMMDD-KT often supported a candidate for 
district head who was backed by these businessmen. In addition, it should be noted that Governor Narang 
could not govern the province if he disregarded the strong influence of these businessmen over the local 
economy and politics. Narang was able to win the election because it was held during a period when 
Rasyid's powers were diminished since he had fled abroad to avoid arrest for illegal logging during the 
nationwide anti-illegal-logging campaign. After his return, however, Rasyid established business ties with 
national politicians-cum-businessmen, and he also put Narang into his debt by giving financial support to 
official events sponsored by the provincial government. Rasyid's political influence will be examined 
further in this essay.
25 Davidson, "Violence and Politics in West Kalimantan, Indonesia." Van Klinken, "Indonesia's New 
Ethnic Elites." Yakti Maunati, Identitas Dayak: Komodifikasi dan Politik Kebudayaan (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2004).
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patterns of local politics. This essay will first examine the case of East Kalimantan, 
emphasizing how national political figures exerted influence over political contests 
among Governor Suwarna, the Kutai Kartanegara district head, Syaukani, and the East 
Kutai district head, Awang Faroek Ishak, all of whom campaigned for the governor's 
post during the period between the 2003 and 2008 gubernatorial elections. It will then 
shift to discuss how Abdul Rasyid, a local timber businessman, gained political 
influence over Central Kalimantan and why he and his political allies were never 
arrested despite evidence of their involvement in illegal logging.
2. Swim Together or Sink Together
On September 16, 2007, national media reported that four prominent East 
Kalimantan politicians were the top contenders in the upcoming Golkar provincial 
convention, which was scheduled to select a substitute candidate for governor in 2008. 
The first candidate, Syaukani HR, a provincial chairman of Golkar and the district 
head of Kutai Kartanegara, had withdrawn from the contest because of the December 
2006 investigation by the KPK, the national anti-corruption agency. The four 
candidates were Awang Faroek Ishak, district head of East Kutai; Achmad Amins, 
mayor of Samarinda; Andi Sofyan Hasdam, mayor of Bontang; and Jusuf SK, mayor of 
Tarakan.26 The mayor of Balikpapan, Imdaad Hamid, was said by local media to be the 
dark-horse candidate.27 Incumbent Governor Suwarna Abdul Fatah could not run in 
the election because he was in his second term and had been arrested for corruption in 
June 2006.28
The seven were the most powerful political figures in East Kalimantan, having 
become local government heads in the major cities and districts of the province after 
the fall of Suharto. The cities and districts they governed are rich in mineral resources, 
located in the coastal and southeastern parts of the province (see Map 1). Other 
districts in East Kalimantan are largely covered by forest and less populated.29 Kutai 
Kartanegara, Syaukani HR's region, encompasses a gas field, making it a hub for 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) production; the chief extraction facilities are located in 
Bontang. East Kutai has huge coal mines where a multinational company, Kaltim 
Prima Coal (KPC), has been operating since the early 1980s. Samarinda, the provincial 
capital, and Balikpapan and Tarakan have oil fields and refineries. All this makes East 
Kalimantan one of the most critical provinces for the national economy. This explains 
why the central government controls most of the mining contracts.30 Through public 
corporations, Jakarta has entered into joint ventures with multinational companies 
such as the US-based Tesoro, British Petroleum (BP), and Rio Tinto of Australia, and
26 S. G. Wibisono, "Partai Golkar Kalimantan Timur Gelar Konvensi," Tempo Interaktif, September 16, 2007.
27 "Jusuf Kalla Terkejut," Banjarmasin Post, March 18, 2007.
28 Riky Ferdianto, "Gubernur Kalimantan Timur Ditahan," Tempo Interaktif, June 19, 2006.
29 East Kalimantan has a total of four cities (Samarinda, Balikpapan, Bontang, and Tarakan) and nine 
districts (Kutai Kartanegara, East Kutai, West Kutai, Bulungan, Berau, Malinau, Nunukan, Pasir, and 
Penajam Paser Utara).
30 According to Law No. 55/ 2001, local governments can issue coal mining concessions.
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domestic companies such as Arifin Panigoro's Medco, Bakrie's Bumi Resources,31 and 
Tanito Harum. Revenues from oil and natural gas made up 30.1 percent in 2006 and 
25.0 percent in 2007 of Indonesia's overall national income.32
Source: Direktorat Jenderal Listrik dan Pemanfaatan Energi, "Peta Potensi Energi Nasional Provinsi Kalimantan Timur,"
Direktorat Jenderal Listrik dan Pemanfaatan Energi, http://www.djlpe.esdm.go.id/modules/_website/images/content/11994518792.pdf 
(accessed June 15, 2008).
Direktorat Jenderal Minyak dan Gas Bumi, "Indonesia Petroleum Contract Area Mao: Status March 01, 2008," Departemen 
Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, http://www.migas.esdm.go.id (accessed July 7, 2008).
According to the 2000 census, around 2.4 million people live in East Kalimantan. 
Seventy percent (70.4) of the province's population is concentrated in the four cities 
(Samarinda, Balikpapan, Bontang, and Tarakan) and in two of the nine districts (Kutai 
Kartanegara and East Kutai).33 Residents in these cities and districts are mainly
31 Arifin Panigoro and the owner of the Bakrie Group Aburizal Bakrie are both businessmen-cum- 
politicians. Arifin Panigoro was the PDI-P faction chairman in the People's Consultative Assembly 
(Majel is Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), the highest legislative body of the state in 2002-2003. He, 
however, resigned from the PDI-P in 2005 and formed a new party, the Democratic Renewal Party (Partai 
Demokrasi Pembaruan, PDP) with Laksamana Sukardi and other former PDI-P politicians. Aburizal 
Bakrie is a Golkar politician and he became the Coordinating Minister for the Economy in 2004 and the 
Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare in 2005.
Departemen Keuangan Republik Indonesia, "Perkembangan Perpajakan 2006-2007," "Penerimaan 
Negara Bukan Pajak & Hibah, 2006-2007," Departemen Keuangan Republik Indonesia, 
http: / / www.fiskal.depkeu.go.id (accessed January 30, 2008).
33 The other 29.6 percent of the population lives in seven districts located in the inland, southwestern, and
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descendants of immigrants from Java, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. The 
Javanese are the largest ethnic group (33.3 percent), followed by the Buginese of South 
Sulawesi (18.2 percent), and the Banjarese of South Kalimantan (16.7 percent). These 
groups came to East Kalimantan for various reasons at different times, settling the 
province over the centuries, as migrants fled the Dutch colonization of South Sulawesi 
in the seventeenth century and of South Kalimantan in the nineteenth century. They 
sought employment in oil companies in the early twentieth century and timber 
corporations in the 1970s, and participated in the government's transmigration 
programs in the late 1970s. The indigenous locals in these cities and districts comprise 
the Kutais (11.7 percent), who are descendents from the aristocrats and subjects of the 
Kutai Kingdom that persisted until its integration with Indonesia in 1949, and the 
indigenous Dayaks (roughly around 7-8 percent), who mostly reside in the interior, 
although some have moved to the urban areas for education and job opportunities.34
The governor and the six heads of the major cities and districts share common 
political histories despite their different ethnic backgrounds. Though they won their 
positions as local government heads after the fall of Suharto and the advent of 
decentralization, they had been established players in provincial political circles 
through much of the Suharto era and had held high positions in the provincial 
government, quasi-government organizations, and/or Golkar. Governor Suwarna, for 
example, is a former military official and was deputy governor of East Kalimantan 
from 1994 to 1998. He is a Sundanese from West Java. Achmad Amins, the mayor of 
Samarinda, is a former local bureaucrat of the city, who served as assistant secretary of 
the municipal government in 1994 to 1998, and as deputy mayor in 1998 to 2000. He 
was also the provincial vice chairman of the government-sponsored Indonesian Youth 
National Committee (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI) from 1980 to 1985 
and provincial chairman of Golkar's youth organization, the Indonesian Reform Youth 
Force (Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia, AMPI), from 1985 to 1990. He is of 
mixed ethnicity, being of Buginese, Wajo, and Kaili (of South Sulawesi) lineage.
Imdaad Hamid, the mayor of Balikpapan, was formerly an officer with the 
provincial Regional Development Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Daerah, BAPPEDA) from 1968 to 1986. He was appointed as acting head of the Bureau 
of Public Relations in 1986 and held that post until 1991, and became provincial 
secretary of the Agriculture Extension Office (Balai Penyuluhan Pertanian: BPP) in 
1991, a position he held until 1998. He is Kutai, and his father-in-law is a Kutai
northern parts of the province. The census does not account for those who are less than five years old. 
Badan Pusat Statistik, Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000 (Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 
2001), p. 75.
34 The total number of Dayaks in East Kalimantan is unknown since the Dayak population was counted 
and listed according to their subethnic categories, and many Dayak men and women are classified as 
"others" in the census. It can, however, be estimated that around 7-8 percent of the total population of the 
four cities and two districts is made up by Dayaks because Dayaks in East Kalimantan are mostly 
Christians, and the Christian population in these cities and districts constitute 8.7 percent of the total 
population. The Javanese, Buginese, Banjarese, and Kutai are almost all Muslims. Population in the other 
seven districts of this province is composed mainly of Dayaks (probably around 25 percent of the total 
population of the seven districts), the Javanese (20.6 percent), the Buginese (18.4 percent), the local Paser of 
the southwestern part of the province (7.1 percent), and the Kutai (3.4 percent). Badan Pusat Statistik, 
Penduduk Indonesia: Hasil sensus Penduduk Tahun 2000, pp. 39, 75.
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aristocrat. Andi Sofyan Hasdam, the mayor of Bontang, is a doctor who served at the 
general hospital in Samarinda from 1988 to 1997. He also worked at a hospital owned 
by LNG companies affiliated with the public oil corporation Pertamina in Bontang 
from 1993, until he became mayor in 2001. He was a member of the provincial 
parliament from 1998 to 1999, and also acted as provincial chairman of the Indonesian 
Medical Doctors (Ikatan Dokter Indonesia Association), a post he held from 1994 to 
1998, and provincial vice chairman of Golkar from 1998 to 1999. He is a Buginese from 
South Sulawesi. Jusuf SK, the mayor of Tarakan, is also a doctor and worked as 
hospital director at the general hospital in Tarakan from 1987 to 1995 and in Samarinda 
from 1995 to 1998. He was the subdelegate of provincial KNPI in Tarakan from 1982 to 
1986 and became general chairman of the Association of All-Indonesia Municipality 
Governments (Asosiasi Pemerintah Kota Seluruh Indonesia, APEKSI) in 2000. He was 
born in Tarakan and is of mixed Indian, Javanese, and Banjarese ethnicity. Awang 
Faroek Ishak, the district head of East Kutai, was a scholar who taught at Mulawarman 
University in Samarinda from 1975 to 1987. He became a member of parliament, 
representing East Kalimantan from 1987 to 1997, and he was also provincial chairman 
of KNPI from 1982 to 1995, and provincial secretary of Golkar from 1983 to 1988. He 
was born to an aristocratic Kutai family.35
Finally, Syaukani HR was born in Kutai of Kutai, Banjarese, and Makassarese 
ethnicity. He was not directly linked to the provincial political elite that dominated the 
region during the Suharto era, but his father-in-law belongs to an aristocratic Kutai 
family.36 A former local bureaucrat in the Kutai district, the district chairman of Golkar 
from 1993 to 2003, and the chairman of the Kutai district assembly in 1997-99, 
Syaukani was a close friend of top provincial bureaucrats and politicians. It was 
because of these ties that he became the provincial chairman of Golkar in 2003. He was 
then able to use his position to develop close ties with the party's national leaders. He 
became the general chairman of the Association of All-Indonesia District Governments 
(Asosiasi Pemerintah Kabupaten Seluruh Indonesia, APKASI) in 2000.
It is obvious that these seven men would have come to know each other through 
personal interactions in school, university, quasi-government youth organizations, 
political parties, or the workplace. Their occupations and political careers likewise 
indicate that they had connections with national political figures via networks of 
military, party, and national youth organizations. For example, Achmad Amins, the 
mayor of Samarinda, was close to Syamsul Muarif, former provincial chairman of 
AMPI in South Kalimantan and also one of the Golkar cadres in charge of Kalimantan 
after the fall of Suharto.37 These provincial elites dominated elections for local
35 Akiko Morishita, "Soeharto Taisei Hokaigo no Indonesia Chiho Seiji: Nishi, Chubu, Higashi Kalimantan 
no riken wo nigirunowa douitta hitotachi ka" [Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Who Controls 
Local Resources in West, Central, and East Kalimantan?] (PhD dissertation, Kyoto University, 2006), pp. 
187-221.
36 Ibid., pp. 203-21.
37 Syamsul Muarif was born to a Banjarese family in South Kalimantan in 1948. He was the provincial 
chairman of AMPI in South Kalimantan from 1985 to 1989. He met Achmad Amins at regional meetings of 
AMPI, at which all four provincial chairpersons in Kalimantan gathered. Syamsul Muarif has also been a 
member of parliament from 1987 up to the present, and he became Minister of State for Communications 
and Information in 2001-2005. H. M. Ridwan Tasa and Umar Vaturusi, Pergumulan H. Achmad Amins 
(Jogjakarta: Ombak, 2003), pp. xxi-xxii. Achmad became the provincial chairman of AMPI in the 1980s.
92 Akiko Morishita
government heads after decentralization, owing to the strong political and financial 
support they received from national political and business figures.
Since the central government, along with large foreign and domestic corporations, 
had exploited East Kalimantan's rich mineral resources during the Suharto era, local 
demands and opposition against the center and companies became open and fierce 
after the collapse of the New Order. In 1999, East Kalimantan's provincial assembly 
challenged the central government, demanding the implementation of federalism in 
Indonesia and a bigger share of revenues from mineral resources. It opposed the new 
law that divided resource revenues between the center and regions and that granted 
only 15 percent of oil revenues and 30 percent of gas revenues to the regional 
governments, and it demanded instead 75 percent of the revenue from local oil and gas 
extraction.38 Local Dayak communities also protested against coal mining by PT 
Trubalndo Coal Mining of the Thailand-based Banpu and the gold mining by Rio 
Tinto's PT Kelian Equatorial Mining, operations that encroached on Dayaks' 
customary land.39
The huge business potentials that national elites saw in the mining sector 
compelled them to defend their interests against these outbreaks of local opposition. 
One way in which they tried to do so was to reassert control over local politics. This 
proved difficult, however, because these elites could not prove that they had roots in 
the region and therefore were impeded by the electoral provision requiring putra 
daerah, i.e., more local participation in politics. The only way and the most efficient way 
for the national elite to maintain control over these business opportunities was to 
support provincial political elite representatives, especially old acquaintances, whose 
election would then allow them to protect their own business interests from local 
resentments or appropriation, and/or might enable them to claim a share in some of 
the revenues from rich sectors like mining. The story of the disgraced governor of East 
Kalimantan, Suwarna Abdul Fatah, exemplifies how these ties developed and 
operated.
Suwarna Abdul Fatah was born to a Sundanese family in Bogor, West Java, in 1944. 
In 1966, he entered the National Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional, AMN) 
and soon after made steady progress in his military career, rising to district military 
commander of Tangerang (Dandim 0506/BS) in 1985, a post he held into 1987, after 
which he became assistant for intelligence at the Military Regional Command of 
Sriwijaya territory of Southern Sumatra (Wakil Asisten Intel Kodam II/SWJ) in 
1987-89, then assistant for intelligence at Kodam of Tanjungpura territory of 
Kalimantan (Asintel Kodam VI/TPR) in 1989-90, and resort military commander of 
Manokwari territory of Irian Jaya (Danrem 171/PVT) in 1990-93. In 1994, the governor 
of East Kalimantan, Mohammad Ardans, took office for a second term, and Suwarna 
was appointed as deputy governor. During the period when he was stationed at 
Kodam of Tanjungpura, from 1989 to 1990, he operated under the command of Z. A. 
Maulani, a South Kalimantan native. As the commander, Maulani wielded strong 
political influence in Kalimantan. It was he who put Mohammad Ardans, a Banjarese
38 "East Kalimantan Legislators Join Call for Federalism," ]akarta Post, December 2,1999.
39 "Mining Giants Benefit from Crisis," Down to Earth 39, November 1998, http: / /dte.gn.apc.org/ 
39min.htm (accessed May 2, 2008).
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local bureaucrat of South Kalimantan descent, forward as governor of East Kalimantan 
in 1988 against the wishes of Javanese military officials.40
Suwarna was appointed as governor in June 1998, a month after the fall of Suharto. 
At that time, the process of selecting local government heads still followed the old 
system, according to which the president appointed the governor based on the polling 
results in the provincial assembly.41 Suwarna's appointment was backed by Kodam,42 
but it was bolstered by the support of Maulani, then head of the Intelligence 
Coordinating Body (Kepala Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, Kabakin). After taking 
office, Suwarna won over the local Dayak and Kutai bureaucrats by placing them in 
choice positions in his government. He appointed Dayak officers to key positions, as in 
the cases of Yurnalis Ngayoh (former assistant secretary of the provincial government), 
who became deputy governor in 1998; Marthin Billa (former assistant secretary of the 
district government of Bulungan), appointed as secretary of the new district 
government of Malinau in 1999; and Rama Alexander Asia (a former staff member at 
the Provincial Investment Coordinating Board), who became the acting district head of 
new West Kutai district in 1999. Suwarna also appointed Kutai officers to significant 
posts; in this way, Chaidir Hafiedz (former deputy governor) became deputy governor 
again in 1998; Imdaad Hamid (former provincial secretary of BPP) became assistant 
secretary of the provincial government in 1998; and Awang Faroek Ishak (former 
Parliament member) was appointed as the provincial head of the Environmental 
Impact Management Board in 1998 and as the acting district head of the new East 
Kutai district in 1999.43 Imdaad Hamid, in turn, was elected as mayor of Balikpapan, 
and Marthin Billa, Rama Alexander Asia, and Awang Faroek Ishak were elected as the 
district heads of Malinau, West Kutai, and East Kutai, respectively, in 2001. This 
pattern of appointments and achievements helped Suwarna to maintain good 
relationships with these district and municipal governments since his allies had 
assumed the top positions in these organizations amidst the tumultuous backdrop of 
reformasi.
Suwarna also tried to purchase the KPC coal mining shares in the name of the 
province, thereby portraying himself as a defender of local interests against the central 
government, which had monopolized profits from the mining sector during the 
Suharto era. In the dispute over the divestment of KPC shares, he was supported by 
Moetojib (former regional military commander of Tanjungpura, 1992-93), David Salim 
(nephew of a national tycoon Sudono Salim), and Laksamana Soekardi (PDI-P44 
politician and Minister of State-Owned Enterprises). He was, however, defeated in this 
strategy by Purnomo, the national Minister of Energy, and two multinational 
companies—specifically BP and Rio Tinto—which had owned all KPC shares, for these 
companies then transferred all their shares in KPC to PT Bumi Resources, a company
40 Burhan Djabier Magenda, "The Surviving Aristocracy in Indonesia: Politics in Three Provinces of the 
Outer Islands" (PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1989), p. 246.
41 Local assemblies were given authority to choose local government heads after the implementation of 
Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government. However, this indirect electoral system was abolished when a 
direct election system was introduced in 2005.
42 Prasetyawan, "Government and Multinationals," p. 169.
43 Morishita, "Soeharto Taisei Hokaigo no Indonesia Chiho Seiji," pp. 198-99.
44 PDI-P, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle.
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controlled by the prominent Golkar politician Aburizal Bakrie.45 After this setback, 
Suwarna opted to acquire an old KPC mining site of fifty-thousand hectares and 
allocated it to his aides, to the provincial assembly chairman, Sukardi Djarwo Putro 
(who was also the provincial secretary of PDI-P), and to the Jakarta-based domestic 
mining companies PT Kitadin, PT Bukit Baiduri Enterprise, and PTTanito Harum.46
Suwarna had a hard time getting reelected in 2003. Local assemblies were given 
authority to choose government heads after the implementation of Law No. 22/1999 
on Regional Government. Golkar was ousted as the top party by the PDI-P after the 
1999 general election. Moreover, the Golkar provincial branch did not initially 
nominate him as its candidate for governor, although it had supported him in the 
previous election.47 As it happened, the district and municipal branches strongly 
dissented against the provincial decision and demanded Suwarna be chosen as 
Golkar's candidate and that the provincial chairman be replaced by Syaukani, then a 
district chairman of the party.48 This protest "from below" forced provincial party 
chieftains to concede to the demands of party members. There is no incontrovertible 
evidence to indicate who was behind this "rebellion" against the provincial branch, but 
it is safe to say that Syamsul Muarif, a leading national member of Golkar who took 
charge of the Kalimantan region, may have had a role to play, given his close 
acquaintance with Maulani, Suwarna's former military boss.49
Consequently, Suwarna secured twelve votes out of a total of forty-five in the 
provincial assembly. He still needed more votes to ensure victory and found these in 
the other parties. The PDI-P controlled fourteen seats and fielded its Javanese 
provincial chairman, Imam Munjiat, as its candidate. The other Golkar candidate, 
Awang Faroek Ishak, failed to get the support of the party but was supported by other 
parties that controlled six seats in total.50 Suwarna sought the help of Theo Syafei, a 
retired military officer and Megawati's aide in the PDI-P. He was the chief of the 
Committee for Winning the General Election (Panitia Pemenangan Pemilihan Umum, 
Papu) of the PDI-P. Theo allegedly received 600 million rupiah (roughly US$70,000) to 
support Suwarna. He summoned the PDI-P members of the East Kalimantan 
provincial assembly in the central East Java city of Surabaya and instructed them to 
vote for Suwarna.51 On June 2, 2003, Suwarna was reelected with twenty-four votes
45 Prasetyawan, "Government and Multinationals," pp. 161-89.
46 "50.000 Ha Lahan Eks KPC Dikuasai Pengusaha," Kompas, May 31, 2002.
47 The provincial leaders of Golkar referred to the following three men as the party's potential candidates: 
Awang Faroek Ishak, Harbiansyah Hanafiah (a prominent local businessman and the then-provincial vice 
chairman of Golkar), and Yos Sutomo (a prominent local businessman). Morishita, "Soeharto Taisei 
Hokaigo no Indonesia Chiho Seiji," pp. 199-200.
48 "Menjelang Suksesi Gubernur, Golkar Kaltim Pecah," Kompas, January 25, 2003.
49 Syamsul and Maulani were both born in South Kalimantan. When Syamsul was one of the provincial 
leaders of Golkar in South Kalimantan and a parliament member in 1987-92, Maulani was Panglima 
Kodam (Pangdam) of the Kalimantan region in 1988-1991. Syamsul attended the funeral of Maulani along 
with the present and former presidents of Golkar, Jusuf Kalla and Akbar Tandjung. "Mengenang Mantan 
Kabakin ZA Maulani, Pemberani Dan Suka Blak-blakan," Banjarmasin Post, April 6, 2005.
50 The political parties supporting Awang Faroek Ishak were the NU-based National Awakening Party 
(Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) and the NU party (Partai NU), the Muslim-based Crescent Star Party 
(Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) and the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), and a splinter party of Golkar, the 
Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan dan Persatuan, PKP).
51 Hanibal W. Y. et al., "Politik Uang Para Hulubalang," Tempo 19,32, July 7-13, 2003, pp. 26-30. WM,
Tomi Lebang, Hannibal W. Y. Wijayanta, Redy M. Z., "Sogok Miliaran Ulah Siapa?" Tempo 19,32, July 7-13,
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while Imam Munjiat only received seven votes, and Awang Faroek Ishak won just 
thirteen votes.52 Reports of election fraud were posted by the national media, but 
Suwarna could not be charged because of lack of evidence. Theo Syafei submitted a 
letter of resignation to PDI-P president Megawati and the party secretary general 
Soetjipto, taking responsibility for the loss, but they did not accept his resignation.53 
Their refusal suggests that Theo Syafei's decision to agree to Suwarna's proposal was 
reinforced by the decision of the PDI-P leaders to support Suwarna's candidacy at the 
expense of Imam Munjiat.54
Suwarna's ascension to power is just one of many examples of the ways in which 
East Kalimantan's leaders have relied on their connections with national politicians to 
prop up their power base. But if they depend too much on these national links, they 
become vulnerable when realignments in national politics occur. The 2004 general and 
presidential elections and subsequent events brought about dramatic changes in the 
power of the Indonesian presidency and the balance of power among the major 
political parties. Golkar recovered its dominant position in the parliament and 
Megawati was defeated in the presidential election by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
while Vice President Jusuf Kalla was elected as president of Golkar. In addition, 
Suwarna's former military boss, Maulani, passed away in April 2005; this was yet 
another loss to the old guard.55
These changes in national political networks exposed the fragility of Suwarna's 
position. As his national patrons waned in power, local tensions reemerged, most 
notably the rivalry between Suwarna and Syaukani, the powerful Golkar local 
politician. These two began to tangle over an airport construction project, and soon 
their tiff worsened into a fight over the political leadership of the region.56 The 
hostility reached a boiling point in December 2004 when Syaukani's term as district 
head of Kutai Kartanegara expired and Suwarna unilaterally appointed Awang 
Dharma Bakti (then head of the Provincial Department of Public Works) as acting 
district head, replacing Syaukani.57 Syaukani supporters protested this move, accusing 
Suwarna of corruption, and took their case to the KPK. The leading group in this 
counterattack was called Anti-Corruption Student Solidarity (Solidaritas Mahasiswa 
Anti-Korupsi, Somasi).58
2003, p. 29.
52 "Suwarna AF Terpilih Kembali Pimpin Kaltim," Kompas, June 3, 2003.
53 Imron Rosyid, "Sekjen PDI Perjuangan Akui Theo Syafei Minta Non Aktif," Tempointeraktif, July 5, 2003. 
Imron Rosyid, "PDI Perjuangan Tolak Pengunduran Diri Theo Syafi'i," Tempointeraktif, July 23, 2003
54 Prasetyawan, "Government and Multinationals," p. 172.
55 "Mengenang Mantan Kabakin ZA Maulani," Banjarmasin Post, April 6, 2005.
56 Redaksi Majalah Bongkar, "Suwarna-Syaukani Sempat Islah," Majalah Bongkar, January 7, 2007.
57 DPRD Kutai Kartanegara, "Syaukani Menyesal "Mengangkat" Suwarna," Warta DPRD Kutai 
Kartanegara, March 7, 2005, http: / / www.dprdkutaikartanegara.go.id/bacawarta.php?id=231 (accessed 
May 2, 2008).
58 Sutarto, "Gubernur Kaltim Dilaporkan ke KPK, Korupsi Pesawat Terbang Ringan," Tempointeraktif, 
December 13, 2004. Sutarto, "Somasi Laporkan Gubernur Kalimantan Timur Ke KPK," Tempointeraktif, 
January 11, 2005.
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When KPK started its investigation in October 2005, Suwarna immediately fought 
back.59 A month later, around a hundred pro-Suwarna supporters gathered in front of 
the KPK office and accused Syaukani, who had been reelected district head in June 
2005, of misusing public funds.60 Concerned that this feud would turn into a 
full-blown crisis that could affect the party, Golkar president Jusuf Kalla sent Syamsul 
Muarif to mediate between Suwarna and Syaukani. The envoy took the side of 
Syaukani. Suwarna was arrested on June 19, 2006, and sentenced to seven years in 
prison on March 2, 2007.61 The Golkar national leadership gave Syaukani complete 
control of the province once Suwarna had been jailed, and Syaukani became the most 
powerful candidate for governor in the 2008 direct election.62
Syaukani's triumph was short-lived, however. A rift between Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and Syaukani's political patron Jusuf Kalla intensified in late 2006 after 
Yudhoyono established the Presidential Working Unit for Managing Programs and 
Reform (Unit Kerja Presiden untuk Pengelolaan Program Reformasi, UKP3R) to 
manage the implementation of political and economic reform programs. Kalla opposed 
the formation of UKP3R, complaining that the UKP3R exceeded its role in economic 
policy making, which at the time he believed was, and should be, under his control.63 
He demanded that the unit be suspended and eventually dissolved. At that point, 
Yudhoyono issued an official letter permitting the KPK to investigate Syaukani for 
corruption, allegedly for marking up the cost for a feasibility study concerning the 
construction of Kutai Kartanegara airport and the acquisition of land for this proposed 
new facility. He also expressed his full support for Awang Faroek Ishak (the district 
head of East Kutai), another possible frontrunner for governor, by granting Awang the 
prestigious Medal of Honour for Development (Satya Lencana Pembangunan) award, 
ostensibly for his contribution to national education development.64 Yudhoyono's 
party, the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD), likewise chose to support Awang 
Faroek Ishak in the upcoming gubernatorial election, as did thirteen other political 
parties.65
59 Edy Can, "Gubernur Kalimantan Timur Diperiksa KPK," Tempointeraktif, October 21, 2005.
60 Thoso Priharnowo, "Unjuk Rasa Desak KPK Sidik Kasus Dugaan Korupsi Syaukani," Tempointeraktif, 
November 24, 2005.
61 "Suwarna-Syaukani Sempat Islah," Majalah Bongkar, January 7, 2007. Ferdianto, "Gubernur Kalimantan 
Timur Ditahan," Tempointeraktif, June 19, 2006. Kartika Candra, "Suwarna A.F Dituntut 7 Tahun," 
Tempointeraktif, March 2, 2007.
62 Indonesia started to implement a direct election system for local government heads in 2005.
63 "Ketidaktahuan Wapres Soal UKP3R Bisa Jadi Masalah," Kompas, November 2, 2006. Suhartono, 
"Wapres: Koordinasi UKP3R Tidak Dibutuhkan," Kompas, November 3, 2006. Suhartono, "Presiden 
Diminta Bubarkan UKP3R," Kompas, November 3, 2006. UKP3R still exists as of early 2008, despite the 
controversy surrounding it.
64 Awang Faroek Ishak is a provincial chairman of the Education Board (Dewan Pendidikan Provinsi 
Kalimantan Timur, DPPKT). He was one of the nine local government heads who received this award 
from President Yudhoyono, and the only person to be so honored in East Kalimantan. The others include 
Rush Zainal (governor of Riau) and Rudi Arifin (governor of South Kalimantan). "Awang Faroek 
Satu-satunya Asal Kaltim," Samarinda Pos, November 26, 2007.
65 Among the other thirteen parties supporting Awang Faroek Ishak, there are PBB, PPP, the 
Muhammadiya-based National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), the Christian-based 
Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS), and a splinter party of PDI-P, the Freedom Bull 
National Party (Partai National Banteng Kemerdekaan, PNBK). "Awang Faroek Siap Diperiksa," 
Banjarmasin Post, December 3, 2007.
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The news of Syaukani's detention at Jakarta Regional Police Headquarters in 
March 2007 shocked Jusuf Kalla. He and Bomer Pasaribu, another leading national 
figure of Golkar, vowed to back up Syaukani, promising not to replace him with 
anyone else.66 Syaukani, however, was sentenced to two and a half years in jail on 
December 14, 2007, and the court's decision forced Kalla and provincial leaders of 
Golkar to withdraw their support for Syaukani as their candidate. Syaukani was also 
dismissed as district head by the newly appointed minister of Home Affairs, 
Mardiyanto, a former military official who is Yudhoyono's right-hand man.67 The 
election of governor was scheduled for May 2008, but Golkar only began considering 
an alternative candidate in early 2008. Awang Faroek Ishak appeared to be the leading 
candidate, but he too proved vulnerable. Awang was accused of corruption involving 
the construction of an East Kutai district government office complex and became a 
target of the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office (Kejaksaan Agung Republik 
Indonesia), which began investigating the case in April 2007. This was a month after 
Suwarna's court conviction and Syaukani's incarceration.68 President Yudhoyono, 
however, did not issue the permission letter for Kejaksaan Agung to arrest Awang for 
an investigation despite the demands of a pro-Syaukani group that the president do 
so.69
Golkar finally chose Jusuf SK (former provincial leader of KNPI in charge of 
Tarakan and then mayor of Tarakan) as its candidate. He was pitted against the 
PDI-P's candidate, Nusyirwan Ismail (Banjarese bureaucrat and then assistant 
secretary of the provincial government); against Ahmad Amins (former provincial 
chairperson of AMPI and then mayor of Samarinda), who was supported by the Justice 
and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the Pancasila Patriot's Party 
(Partai Patriot Pancasila), and the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, PKB); and against Awang Faroek Ishak (former parliament member and then 
district head of East Kutai, as noted above) who was supported by fourteen parties, 
including Yudhoyono's PD, PPP, and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat 
Nasional, PAN). The direct election system gave the electorate the right to select their 
government leader, but national political party leaders still exercised their influence 
over the process of selecting candidates.
The election was held on May 26, 2008, and Awang Faroek Ishak garnered 28.9 
percent of the votes, while Achmad Amins won 26.9 percent, Jusuf SK won 25.2 
percent, and Nusyirwan Ismail received 19 percent.70 Under Law No. 12/2008 on 
elections for local government heads, it was determined that the second round of the 
contest between the first- and second-place candidates—in this case, Awang Faroek
66 Tahan Bupati Kutai Kartanegara," Republika, March 18, 2007. "Jusuf Kalla Terkejut," Banjarmasin 
Post, March 18, 2007.
67 Eko Ari Wibowo, "Syaukani Dinonaktifkan," Tempointemktif, September 20, 2007. S. G. Wibisono, 
"Golkar Bahas Pengganti Syaukani," Tempointeraktif, December 18, 2007. When Yudhoyono was Armed 
Forces Chief of Social and Political Affairs (Kepala Staf Sosial Politik, Kasospol), Mardiyanto was his 
assistant.
68 "Awang Faroek Diperiksa Kejaksaan Agung," Samarinda Pos, April 24, 2007.
69 "Demo Anti Awang Faroek Ricuh," Samarinda Pos, December 7, 2007.
70 Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kalimantan Timur, "Pemilu Gubernur/Wakil Gubernur Kalimantan Timur: 
Perolehan Suara Manual," Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kalimantan Timur, http: / /kaltim.kpu.go.id/ 
index.html (accessed July 7, 2008).
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Ishak and Achmad Amins—would be held in September 2008 since none of the 
candidates had won more than 30 percent of the votes in the first round.71
The case of East Kalimantan shows how national power holders control a region 
rich in mineral resources during the era of decentralization. Mineral resources, 
especially oil and natural gas, are crucial for the state economy, and thus the central 
government still fully controls the mining contracts through public corporations, even 
after the implementation of decentralization, and these corporations have 
subcontracted to multinational companies and a few Jakarta-based domestic 
companies. The mining industries need a great deal of capital and heavy machinery, 
and support from many technical experts, which means there is little space for the 
development of local extraction businesses. The center's exploitation of these resources, 
however, has generated local demands and protests against the central government 
and the enterprises conducting mining operations, and these local resentments broke 
out into the open and grew fierce after the collapse of New Order. In such situations, 
national political leaders most likely expected provincial political elites, who had been 
close to them, to assume influential positions as local government heads and conciliate 
the local groups that opposed the mining operations. For this reason, national power 
holders exercised a strong influence on politics in mineral resource-rich regions, and 
were especially involved in the processes of selecting and dismissing local government 
heads. As a consequence, power holders in the regions strongly relied on their 
connections with national politicians to bolster their power base. However, these 
conditions also mean that local leaders tend to become vulnerable in local political 
competitions when their Jakarta patrons fall from power as a result of realignments in 
national politics or if a patron becomes considerably weakened after a major political 
battle. The political rise and fall of Suwarna and Syaukani in East Kalimantan 
exemplify how local political actors in mineral resource-rich regions shared the fate of 
their patrons in national politics.
3. Who Controls Forest-Rich Regions?
Indonesia's forest resources, like its mineral resources, generate enormous profits 
for exporters. The 2006 value of wood-related exports (plywood, other processed 
wood, sawn timber, rattan, rattan-related products, processed rattan, paper, and 
paper-related products), for example, reached US$7.67 billion—9.6 percent of the total 
value of non-oil and gas exports.72 However, national political and business cliques 
have not exercised much influence over local politics in Kalimantan's forest-rich 
regions since the fall of Suharto, a pattern that differs from the political status quo in 
regions such as East Kalimantan, noted for its mineral resources.
In Central Kalimantan, 84 percent of the provincial area is covered by forest, 
according to the Provincial Bureau of Statistics.73 The 2000 census sets the provincial
71 "KPU Tetapkan Pilkada Kaltim Berlangsung Dua Putaran," Antara News, June 10, 2008.
72 Statistics regarding the value of non-oil and gas exports are available on the website of the Indonesian 
Ministry of Trade. Departemen Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, "Ekspor Non Migas Utama Menurut 
Sector," Departemen Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, http: / / www.depdag.go.id/ 
index.php?option=statistik&task=detil&itemid=06010204 (accessed May 16, 2008).
73 Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Tengah and Kantor Statistik Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah,
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population at around 1.8 million, mainly consisting of Banjarese (24.2 percent of the 
total provincial population), Javanese from Java (18.1 percent), and Dayaks (more than 
40 percent).74 The province's main export commodities are wood and articles made 
from wood (40.2 percent of the total provincial exports of 2007).75
During the Suharto era, the central government exercised complete control over the 
forest concessions through Forest Concession Rights (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan, HPH), 
granting the rights to harvest the trees to public corporations, the military, and 
Jakarta-based conglomerates close to Suharto.76 While these Jakarta-based companies 
were granted large-scale logging concessions, local businessmen also benefited when 
the large corporations subcontracted the work out to them. These local businessmen 
were tasked to recruit and supervise workers, to manage logging operations and the 
shipping of timber on site, to conciliate and/or intimidate locals who opposed logging, 
and so forth. Some also engaged in illegal logging to meet the targets of a particular 
company's annual work plan, a cooperative effort that allowed them, at the same time, 
to accumulate their own capital. Their positions were also protected by personal 
connections with local bureaucrats, politicians, military personnel, and police, all of 
whom were important figures when it was necessary to obtain official protection for 
their operations.77
After the fall of Suharto, Indonesia's central government transferred its authority to 
issue small- and medium-scale logging concessions and to grant approval for 
plantation development to the local governments.78 One outcome of this devolution
Kalimantan Tengah Dalam Angka 1998 (Palangkaraya: Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Tengah dan 
Kantor Statistik Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah, 1999), p. 174.
74 Badan Pusat Statistik, Penduduk Indonesia, p. 75.
75 Pemerintah Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah, "Table 3. Nilai Ekspor dan Impor Kalimantan Tengah 
Menurut Komoditas Tahun 2007 (US$ Juta)," Pemerintah Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah,
http:/ / www.kalteng.go.id/ viewarticle.asp?ARTICLE_id=642 (accessed February 22, 2008).
76 Michael L. Ross, Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 157-89. For example, the following organizations are inscribed on the 2004 list 
of logging concession holders: a public corporation Inhutani; Raja Garuda Mas, owned by Suharto's 
step-brother Sukanto Tanoto; the military-related Hanurata and ITCI; companies owned by Suharto's 
cronies, including Barito Pacific (owner, Prayogo Pangestu), Kalamur (owner, Salim), and Kalimanis 
(owner, Bob Hasan); and other timber conglomerates, such as Alas Kusuma, Kayu Lapis Indonesia, and 
Djajanti. In Central Kalimantan, large-scale logging concessions are controlled by Inhutani III, Barito 
Pacific Timber, Alas Kusuma's PT Sari Bumi Kusuma Kalteng, Djajanti's PT Nusantara Plywood, and so 
forth. See Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia (APHI), "Daftar HPH dan HPHTI Anggota APHI per 1 
April 2004 dihitung menurut ijin Dephut yang masih berlaku Peb 04 dan menurut APHI Des 03," APHI, 
http: / / www.rimbawan.com (accessed March 5, 2008). See also Map 2.
77 For details of the subcontracting system in the forestry sector, see John F. McCarthy, "Sold Down the 
River: Renegotiating Public Power over Nature in Central Kalimantan," in Renegotiating Boundaries, eds. 
Nordholt and Klinken, pp. 157-59,162-63; and Budi Baik Siregar, Kedermawanan Alam Kalimantan: Sebuah 
Pengungkapan Tanggung Jawab Sosial Perusahaan di Kalimantan Tengah (Jakarta: Piramedia, 2004), pp. 109-11.
78 Law No. 41 /1999 and Government Regulation No. 6/1999 allowed a governor to issue HPH 
concessions for up to ten thousand hectares, and a district head to issue the Forest Products Harvesting 
Rights (Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, HPHH) for up to one hundred hectares annually. Government 
Regulation No. 34/2002, however, reduced the capacity of district heads to grant such concessions. The 
central and local governments also can issue the Plantation Business Permit (Izin Usaha Perkebunan: IUP), 
according to the Minister of Agriculture Decree No. 357/Kpts/H k.350/5/2002.
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was that the collusion between politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen over control 
of forest areas became more conspicuous. The businessmen who were able to establish 
close links with local politicians and bureaucrats grew extremely wealthy, since their 
businesses were protected by local allies. These businessmen, in turn, expanded their 
social, economic, and political influence in the region, ultimately reaching a point at
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which their network was often stronger than the Central Kalimantan government 
itself. One such successful businessman, Abdul Rasyid, went into politics backed by
his immense financial clout.79
Abdul Rasyid was born to a local Malay family in Pangkalan Bun, the capital of 
West Kotawaringin district, Central Kalimantan, in 1958. After graduating from a local 
high school, he was employed as a subcontractor by the public corporation Inhutani 
III, which owned the logging concessions of 805,010 hectares in Central Kalimantan 
(see Map 2).80 Rasyid worked for the company in different parts of the province—in 
West Kotawaringin, East Kotawaringin, and South Barito. When the timber had been 
thoroughly harvested in one area, he would venture into tracts of protected forest and 
continue logging there to meet the targets of the company's annual plan. But in 1981, 
he established his own company, Tanjung Lingga, in Pangkalan Bun, with a small 
sawmill. The Tanjung Lingga Group (TLG) soon expanded to include woodworking 
enterprises, oil-palm plantations, crude palm oil factories, mining, shipping and 
shipbuilding, cattle breeding, banking, and media outlets. Within a short time, TLG 
was employing more than five thousand employees and had set up branches in Jakarta 
and Singapore.81
Rasyid nurtured strong connections with local authorities to gain their favor and 
protect his business. His colluding partners in government included the heads of the 
local government, high officials in the Regional Forestry Office (Dinas Kehutanan) and 
the Regional Development Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Daerah, Bappeda), local assemblymen, the police, and the military. His brother Ruslan 
had joined Golkar during the Suharto era and became its district chairman in West 
Kotawaringin in 2003, while Rasyid's nephew Agustiar joined the PDI-P and became 
the party's district chairman for West Kotawaringin.82 With his allies' help and 
influence, Rasyid became a regional representative in the People's Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), the highest legislative body of the 
state, in 1999. About a month before the 1999 general elections, he extended financial
79 While the Rasyid family wields great influence over the western part of the province, another local 
timber businessman, Sulaiman HB, exercises control over the eastern part. A social activist, KMA Usop, 
whose organization played an important role in the bloody Madurese-Dayak conflicts in 2000-2001 also 
succeeded in putting some of his followers forward as district heads, but they govern only in remote and 
economically worthless districts. See Morishita, "Soeharto Taisei Hokaigo no Indonesia Chiho Seiji," pp. 
109-16,123-30. For a discussion concerning the relations among Jakarta-based conglomerates, local timber 
businessmen, local governments, military, police, and villagers over access to forest resources in the 
western part of Central Kalimantan in the era of decentralization, see McCarthy, "Sold Down the River," 
pp. 151-76.
80 Pusat Inventarisasi dan Statistik Kehutanan Badan Planologi Kehutanan, Departemen Kehutanan, Data 
dan Informasi Kehutanan Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah (Jakarta: Departemen Kehutanan, 2002).
81 TLG is a family corporation: Rasyid's second wife, Nurriyah, and nephews Sugianto, Agustiar, and 
Rahmat Nasution Hamka all sit on the board of directors and commissioners. His elder brother, Ruslan, is 
also the President Director of the TLG-affiliated company PT Tanjung Menthobi. See Yayasan API, 
Panduan Parlemen Indonesia (Jakarta: Yayasan API, 2001), p. 1039. Environmental Investigation Agency 
(EIA), "Final Cut," EIA, http:/ / www.salvonet.com/eia/old-reports/Forests/Indonesia/FinalCut/ 
(accessed July 11, 2007). Sawit Sumbermas Sarana, "Sekapur Sirih dari Pendiri Perusahaan," and Sawit 
Sumbermas Sarana, "Prakata," both accessible at http: / / www.sss.agro.co.id (accessed July 11, 2007).
82 On Rasyid's brother joining Golkar, see EIA and Telapak, BRIEFING Update on Tanjung Puting National 
Park: A Report to the CGI Meeting Jakarta, December 2003 (London, Washington DC, Bogor: EIA and Telapak, 
2003). Morishita, "Soeharto Taisei Hokaigo no Indonesia Chiho Seiji," pp. 117-18. On Rasyid's nephew 
joining PDI-P, see "Agustiar Siap Bertarung Di Pilkada," Banjarmasin Post, January 31, 2005.
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support not only to Golkar and the PDI-P but also to the other twenty-six political 
parties in the district. Each party received 65 million rupiah (roughly US$8,300).83 
Golkar won ten seats and the PDI-P won eight seats in the West Kotawaringin district 
assembly, making them, respectively, the largest and the second-largest parties in the 
assembly.84 With both parties in power, Rasyid was assured of solid support.
Their connections and influence also enabled the Rasyid family to put forward 
their "friends" as the district heads under the indirect election system. They provided 
500 million rupiah (roughly US$64,000) to a particular candidate, who was thus 
enabled to buy votes in the election.85 Owing in large part to financial support from 
the Rasyid family, Abdul Razak (a former chief of Bappeda in West Kotawaringin) 
won the 2000 election for West Kotawaringin district head; Asmawi Agani (a former 
district head of South Barito) won the 2000 election for governor; Wahyudi K. Anwar 
(a former chief of Bappeda in East Kotawaringin) won the 2000 election for East 
Kotawaringin district head; Duwel Rawing (former Secretary of Bappeda in East 
Kotawaringin) won the 2003 election for Katingan district head; and Nawawi 
Mahmuda (former head of the Provincial Mining Office) won the 2003 election for 
Sukamara district head.86 With his allies in place, Rasyid sought to strengthen his ties 
with the local communities, reaching out to employ locals in his companies, and 
donating rice, sugar, cooking oil, and other food items to urban and rural residents 
when the 1998 economic crisis, and the July 2000 violence in Kumai, West 
Kotawaringin, affected these communities.87 And when his elected "friends" started to 
grant oil-palm plantation concessions to TLG, Rasyid threatened those who 
protested—threats backed by his alliance with the regional police.88
As Rasyid was expanding his network, national and international environmental 
groups like Telapak Indonesia and the Environmental Investigation Agency (ElA) 
began to accuse TLG of involvement in illegal logging in Tanjung Puting National 
Park. They released a 1999 report on the problem and lobbied at the meetings of the 
World Bank, IMF, and other international donors involved in Indonesia to raise this 
issue. The illegal logging in Tanjung Puting received international publicity after 60 
Minutes, the weekly news report broadcast by the American television network CBS, 
produced a documentary on the issue in 2001, followed by a similar report by the 
Australian television network ABC in its program Four Corners, broadcast in 2002.89
83 "Tanjung Lingga Bantu Parpol Rp 65 Juta," Banjarmasin Post, May 13,1999.
84 Morishita, "Soeharto Taisei Hokaigo no Indonesia Chiho Seiji," p. 91.
85 Author's interview with a local NGO leader, July 11, 2005.
86 Morishita, "Soeharto Taisei Hokaigo no Indonesia Chiho Seiji," pp. 119-23.
87 "Tanjung Lingga Bagian Beras Gratis," Banjarmasin Post, July 31,1998. "Tanjung Lingga Bagian 
Sembako di Pembuang Hulu," Banjarmasin Post, August 19,1998. The July 2000 riot in Kumai was initiated 
by local timber workers against a malicious timber broker. For more details of the violence in Kumai, see 
"Suasana di Kumai Kembali Mencekam," Kompas, July 9, 2000.
88 A Jakarta-based environment group submitted a written complaint to the National Police concerning 
this matter. Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI), "Surat Terbuka Terhadap Kasus Kekerasan 
Aparat di Desa Runtu, Kecamatan Arun Selatan, Kabupaten Kotawaringin Barat, Kalimantan Tengah" 
WALHI, letter posted May 28, 2005, http: / / www.walhi.or.id/kampanye/
hutan/ shk/ 050528_runtukalteng_sp/ (accessed February 8, 2008).
89 Dave Currey, "Fight to Save Orangutans Intensifies," Animal Welfare Institute (AWI) Quarterly 50,1 
(2001), http: / / www.awionline.org/ pubs/ Quarterly/ Spring2000/orangutans.htm (accessed February 8, 
2008). Australian Broadcasting Corporation, "Timber Mafia," Four Corners, broadcast July 29, 2002,
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The international furor forced the Indonesian government to crack down on illegal 
logging. In November 2001, the Indonesian navy seized three ships, sailing under 
foreign flags, in a northern harbor in Jakarta for attempting to carry timber from 
Central Kalimantan without any legal documents validating the legality of their cargo. 
The ships had hired by two companies whose agent was a subsidiary corporation of 
TLG.
A company staff member Rahmat Nasution (possibly Rasyid's nephew) was 
interviewed as the main suspect in this crime, and the case was later delegated to 
National Police Headquarters in Jakarta. Eventually, it was handed back to the local 
court after West Kotawaringin assemblymen and businessmen lobbied in Jakarta. A 
protest rally of six thousand people in Pangkalan Bun demanded that the seized 
vessels be returned to Central Kalimantan and that Nasution to be tried at the local 
court. District head Abdul Razak likewise wrote a letter to Jakarta stating that the trial 
must be held in the district. In May 2002, all the crew members and the ships were set 
free. As of early 2007, the trial is still going on in the district court, but it seems to have 
essentially vaporized and does not appear to be making progress.90
After news of the crackdown reached him, Rasyid fled abroad, while his nephews 
Sugianto and Agustiar set off on a pilgrimage to Mecca.91 In February 2003, the 
government's investigatory "Wanalaga Operation" was extended to Tanjung Puting 
National Park, but only a few middle-level timber bosses were arrested. The head of 
Wanalaga stated that they would interrogate Sugianto and Agustiar upon their return, 
but this never happened. In fact, TLG recommenced its shipments of illegal logs to 
Vietnam after the operations were completed.92 During Rasyid's absence, his family 
became less powerful in provincial politics; Ruslan lost the fight for the provincial 
chairmanship of Golkar in December 2004.93 Subsequently, a local-born national 
politician defeated the incumbent governor who had been supported by the Rasyid 
family in the 2005 gubernatorial election.94 However, Rasyid's family continued to 
control the local assembly in West Kotawaringin. Ruslan remains district chairman of 
Golkar, while his second wife, Nurhidayah, was elected to be a Golkar assembly 
member. Agustiar is also the district chairman of the PDI-P, the second largest party in
http: / / www.abc.net.au/4corners/archives/2002b_Monday29July2002.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).
90 "Legislator Accused of Illegal Logging," Jakarta Post, November 15, 2001. "Anggota DPRD Kobar akan 
Dipanggil Paksa," Radar Sampit, February 16, 2007. "Kisah dari Tiga Kapal," Tempo 34,31, October 21-27, 
2002, pp. 72-73. Jerryanto, "Diduga, Anggota MPR Terlibat Mafia Kayu," Politikindonesia.com, February 25, 
2002, http: / / www.politikindonesia.com/ readhead.php?id=7& jenis=ivs (accessed July 11, 2007).
91 "Polri Buru Keponakan Rasyid," Kalteng Pos, February 27, 2005.
92 EIA and Telapak, BRIEFING, p. 2.
93 "Asmawi Didukung, Ruslan Dikosong," Banjarmasin Post, November 30, 2004.
94 The current governor of Central Kalimantan, Agustin Teras Narang (whose term began in 2005 and will 
end in 2010), is a PDI-P politician and was a member of parliament from 1999 to 2004. The key to his 
gubernatorial election victory was his family background— the Narang family is well-known locally for its 
involvement in Central Kalimantan's history, business, and politics—as well as his own financial power 
and the assistance he most likely received from PDI-P, the party to which he belongs. His grandfather was 
a customary head and also a church leader in the Kapuas area. His father owned N V. Dajak Handel My, 
an old oil distributing company in the region, and was also the chairperson of the Dayak customary 
council. Teras Narang's elder brother is a PDI-P politician and a member of the provincial assembly. 
Author's interview with a local historian, July 11, 2005.
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the region, while Rahmat Nasution became a PDI-P assemblyman in the district 
despite his role as the main suspect in the 2001 timber-smuggling case. Rahmat 
subsequently ran for the district assembly chairmanship but lost to Golkar 
assemblyman Wisman. He recovered later by becoming the deputy chairman of the 
assembly.95
Ultimately, the Rasyid family's involvement in the 2005 election for the district 
head of the West Kotawaringin district proved to be a strategic blunder. In this 
election, Golkar, led by Ruslan, fielded the incumbent district head, Abdul Razak, 
while the PDI-P, led by Agustiar, fielded the former district head, Darman. Both of 
these candidates lost, and the winner was Ujang Iskandar, another famous 
businessman in the district, whose company was not linked to TLG.96 The splitting of 
the votes between two candidates supported by members of the Rasyid family enabled 
Ujang to win the election.
Yet it would be a mistake to write off the family as politically defunct. Its financial 
power remains robust enough to create new links with district and provincial 
politicians. TLG still owns three of the six major local companies listed by the Regional 
Investment Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Daerah, 
BKPMD) of West Kotawaringin.97 These companies engage in a variety of businesses 
in the district, ranging from logging, timber processing, and plantation construction to 
mining. Moreover, Ruslan won the district chairmanship of the Association of 
Indonesian National Construction Companies (Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi 
Nasional Indonesia, Gapensi) in 2001 and again in 2006. In May 2007, his company, 
Tanjung Menthobi, and a TLG-affiliate, Surya Sawit Sejati, donated a substantial 
amount to Central Kalimantan province to honor the fiftieth anniversary of its 
establishment, proving that his family still had the financial ability to support an 
indebted provincial government.98 Then in April 2007, their "friend" Abdul Razak, 
who had lost the election for district head, became the provincial chairman of Golkar, 
signaling the possibility that the family may be on its way to regaining its political 
influence.99
Up to the present, Abdul Rasyid, his family, and his "friends" in government have 
never been imprisoned despite strong accusations leveled against them by national 
and international environmental groups and evidence that they had been involved in 
illegal logging. The state's reluctance to arrest, try, and incarcerate powerful local 
businessmen involved in illegal logging is also exemplified by its handling of the case 
of Adelin Lis in North Sumatra. Adelin Lis is a notorious local timber businessman 
who was arrested on suspicion of illegal logging in September 2006, and then acquitted
95 "Golkar Butuhkan 3 Tambahan Suara," Banjarmasin Post, October 13, 2004. "Tinjau Pengesahan 
Pimpinan DPRD!" Banjarmasin Post, January 20, 2005. "Fraksi Besar Dominasi Komisi A dan C," Radar 
Sampit, January 23, 2007.
96 Iskandar won 39 percent of the votes. Abdul Razak earned 24.1 percent, while Darman won 36.9 percent 
of the votes. For more details of the election results, see Pemerintah Propinsi Kalimantan Tengah, "Flasil 
Perhitungan Final Pilkada 2005 Bupati dan Wakil Bupati Kab. Kotawaringin Barat," posted July 1, 2005, 
http:/ / www.kalteng.go.id/INDO/datapilkadajam.htm (accessed July 11, 2007).
97 BKPMD Kabupaten Kotawaringin Barat, "Profil Pengusaha Daerah," http: / / www.bkpmdkobar.net 
(accessed July 11, 2007).
98 "Terjun Payung dan Delon Jadi Pusat Perhatian," Kalteng Pos, May 24, 2007.
99 "Musdalub Golkar Kalteng," Banjarmasin Post, March 26, 2007.
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in the Medan district court on November 5, 2007, due to lack of evidence. President 
Yudhoyono stated that he would not intervene in this decision despite the social 
protests against the judgment.100 This case indicates that not only local governments, 
but also the central government, are reluctant to arrest powerful timber bosses. Only 
small and middle-level timber brokers were arrested during the central government's 
operations to crack down on illegal logging. It appears that power holders in 
forest-rich regions are likely to escape arrest for illegal activities thanks to protection 
from the state. Their immunity contrasts with the relative vulnerability of elites in 
mineral-rich regions such as East Kalimantan. As noted above, East Kalimantan's two 
most powerful political actors—its governor, Suwarna, and the Kutai Kartanegara 
district head, Syaukani—were arrested and sentenced to prison for corruption.
The foremost reason why national politicians exercise less influence in a forest-rich 
region, compared to regions rich in mineral resources, may have to do with the 
different revenues earned from the related extraction industries. It is likely that the 
central government does not feel the strong need to control the forest-rich regions, 
given that revenues from this sector today are comparatively paltry. Since timber 
harvesting provided only 0.3 percent of the total revenue of the central government in 
2006 and 0.4 percent in 2007, there was not much that the forests could remit to 
Jakarta.101 The central government therefore would not be hit hard financially if the 
forest sector suffers.
Yet, while forest resources are not critically significant to the state economy, they 
remain profitable to the private sector. The forest and plantation concessions available 
at any time also provide opportunities for provincial and district governments that 
wish to establish and maintain close relations with national and/or local businessmen 
by granting the concessions. In such situations, local government officials tend to 
protect and advance the interests of forest-related industries, including informal timber 
businesses. Jakarta-based timber companies would suffer if their main subcontractors 
were arrested for illegal logging. This compelled the companies to seek out new local 
partners, and they preferred those partners who were familiar with the local 
geography, people, bureaucrats, politicians, military, and police. The central 
government and big corporations most likely wanted to avoid the continued loss of 
effective subcontractors, and for this reason they permitted tacitly illegal activities 
carried out by powerful local businessmen in forest-rich regions so long as these local 
entrepreneurs were willing to cooperate with Jakarta-based timber corporations. These 
local businessmen were never imprisoned, even though they were the main suspects in 
illegal logging cases, and they exercised influence on local politics without restraint. In 
fact, powerful Golkar national politicians Aburizal Bakrie and Surya Paloh recently 
created business alliances with Abdul Rasyid and his brother Ruslan. Bakrie's 
company, PT Bakrie Sentosa Persada, entered into a joint venture with Ruslan's PT 
Tanjung Menthobi in September 2007 involving palm oil harvesting; Paloh's Media
100 Hambali Batubara, "Adelin Lis Bebas," Tempointeraktif, November 5, 2007. Fanny Febiana, "Presiden 
Tak Akan Intervensi Kasus Adelin Lis," Tempointeraktif, November 8, 2007.
101 Departemen Keuangan Republik Indonesia, "Perkembangan Perpajakan 2006-2007," "Penerimaan 
Negara Bukan Pajak & Hibah, 2006-2007," Departemen Keuangan Republik Indonesia,
http: / / www.fiskal.depkeu.go.id (accessed January 30, 2008).
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Group joined with Rasyid's TLG in April 2008, in a similar venture.102 Given the 
ongoing evolution and extension of these business networks, it is likely that the Rasyid 
family will further increase its influence in Central Kalimantan.
4. Conclusion
A comparison between East Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan shows how the 
relative profitability of certain natural resources and the structures of resource-related 
industries help determine the degree of central government control over those 
resources, and how this pattern affects the manner in which national elites reconfigure 
relationships with local elites. In turn, it also affects the contours of local political 
competition.
Local contests over government positions and economic resources became fierce 
and intense during the parallel processes of decentralization and electoral 
democratization after the fall of Suharto. Campaigns for putra daerah that required 
more local participation in politics made it difficult for national politicians and 
businesspeople to become local government heads if they could provide no evidence 
that they had roots in the region. Studies on national-local ties in post-Suharto 
Indonesia have pointed out the emergence of multidirectional ties between the central 
government and regions following political decentralization and emphasized a 
bottom-up approach, demonstrating the ways in which local elites have reached out to 
national elites. These analyses tend to give the impression that national political actors 
do not actively pay attention to the regions unless local elites ask for their support or 
challenge them in order to achieve their regional objectives and ambitions. It is true, 
national elites do appear to have abandoned full control over local politics after 
decentralization, but this essay argues that national power holders still have an agenda 
to reinstitute central control over the regions, especially those rich in mineral resources. 
National state leaders and business groups regard mineral resources—especially oil 
and natural gas—as vital to the state economy, and for this reason they continue to 
assert their influence over local politics in the regions. The case of East Kalimantan 
exemplifies how national elites have exercised influence over local elites in this 
mineral-rich region during the era of decentralization, especially in the processes of 
selecting and dismissing local government heads. On the other hand, the case of 
Central Kalimantan suggests that national elites have a different strategy with regard 
to forest-rich regions, for they have generally left control over the regions to local 
power holders. Forest resources have been most profitable for the private sector rather 
than the public sector, and Jakarta-based timber companies holding large-scale logging 
concessions have needed local subcontractors for their business operations on site. 
Hence, the central government has tacitly allowed the illegal activities of such 
subcontractors, who have prospered through illegal logging and thereby gained 
political influence over the region.
102 PT Bakrie & Brothers, Pengumuman Keterbukaan Informasi PT Bakrie & Brothers Tbk (BNBR) (Tercatat Di 
Papan: Pengembangan) No. Peng-57/BEI.PSJ/KI/01-2008 (Jakarta: PT Bakrie & Brothers Tbk, 2008), p. 156. 
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A comparative study of local politics gives us an idea of how national power 
holders control regions in decentralized Indonesia. Based on an analysis of cases from 
East and Central Kalimantan, this essay argues that the strength and the pattern of 
central government control over the regions vary depending on whether a region 
encompasses natural resources that are important for the national economy, and also 
depending on the structures of the local extraction industries. These factors affect the 
patterns of local political competition and the types of local power holders in each 
place. This approach would help us analyze and understand local politics in other 
regions as well. The types of local power holders who emerge in each case and the 
degree of their "independence" from national elites may depend on whether each 
respective region has natural resources that are crucial for the state economy and the 
degree to which local political and business actors have access to the interests of 
resource-related industries. While national elites strategically control local politics in 
regions where they have huge business interests, they may essentially disregard 
resource-poor regions; the only national power holders interested in such areas would 
be the those who have family roots in these regions. I hope that further comparisons 
among other regions will explore the validity of this essay's hypothesis, emphasizing 
resources as a factor that determines the strength and pattern of national elite control 
over regions and the contours of local political competition. A number of areas invite 
consideration, such as forest-rich North Sumatra, oil-rich Riau, the industrial zones of 
West Java and the Riau Archipelago (in which the Batam free trade zone is located), the 
agricultural and small- and medium-scale industrial region of Central Java, and also 
resource-poor regions in Indonesia, such as Southeast Sulawesi and East Nusa 
Tenggara.
The rise of fierce competition over local political power in post-Suharto Indonesia 
has not been chaotic but actually operates within certain parameters established by the 
national elite's agenda to reinstitute control that focuses on economically crucial 
regions. National political leaders will persist in exercising strong influence over such 
regions, especially in the process of selecting candidates for local government posts 
and/or arresting (or not arresting) local power holders on charges of corruption, illegal 
activities, or other crimes while essentially leaving control over regions, which they 
regard as less significant to the state economy, to local power holders.
